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DISCRIMINATION, PLAIN AND SIMPLE 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has attempted to simplify Title VII 
and, with it, discrimination. This process began with the Court's decision in St. 
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks/ and continued in Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc. v. Oncale. 2 In Hicks, the Court emphasized that the inquiry in a Title VII 
disparate treatment race-based case should be aimed solely at whether intentional 
discrimination occurred. In the process, the Court minimized the import of the 
three-part test for proving discrimination that had been announced twenty years 
earlier in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.3 In Oncale, the Court noted that 
any course of conduct yielding discrimination because of sex, regardless of 
whether that conduct fit prior definitions of sex discrimination or sexual 
harassment, may be actionable under Title VII. By cutting away much of the 
structure that flowed from and arguably illuminated its prior vision of 
discrimination in general and race and sex discrimination in particular, the Court 
suggests that Title VII should be relatively simply interpreted and that 
discrimination is or should be relatively easily understood. 
Though the Court's desire for simplification may be reasonable, it may have 
unintended consequences depending on how that desire is interpreted. Whether 
the Court's simplification is of systematic benefit will depend on whether its 
results comport with Title VII's broader vision of discrimination. While the 
Court's simplification may eliminate doctrinal clutter and make Title VII 
somewhat easier to understand, if it also obscures the nuance necessary to discern 
discrimination fully and vigorously enforce Title VII, it serves little purpose. 
This short essay is a brief examination of the Court's relatively recent 
attempts to simplify Title VII and employment discrimination; it is not intended to 
be a comprehensive review of the Court's discrimination jurisprudence. Rather, it 
seeks to identify a few concerns with and implications of the Court's apparent 
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desire to simplify Title VII jurisprudence. Part I briefly examines how the Court 
has simplified employment discrimination through Hicks and Oncale. Part II 
examines how the Court's simplifications have been used. Part III suggests 
concerns that should accompany the Court's simplification. 
I. SIMPLIFYING TITLE VII AND REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION 
A. Simplifying The Race Discrimination Inquiry 
Title VII bars race discrimination.4 However, proving through direct 
evidence that an employment decision was motivated by discrimination is difficult, 
even when discrimination actually motivated the decision.5 Direct evidence of 
discrimination, i.e., evidence of a decisionmaker's mental state, is notoriously 
difficult to find, though discrimination unquestionably exists.6 Employers rarely 
acknowledge race discrimination, and Title VII provides additional incentive to 
hide such discrimination.7 By necessity, allowing discrimination to be proven 
indirectly has been a key to effectively enforcing Title VII. 
1. The McDonnell Douglas Test 
In McDonnell Douglas v. Green,8 the Supreme Court memorialized a three-
part test for indirectly proving race discrimination in Title VII disparate treatment 
cases. 9 Though the McDonnell Douglas court did not note precisely why it 
created the three-part test, at least two possibilities exist.10 The first is that the 
4. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race ... "). 
5. See Copley v. Bax Global, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2000) ("Because employers 
who engage in illicit discrimination rarely leave records of their invidious acts, cases in which 
discrimination is proved through direct evidence are rare"). 
6. Even racial slurs or commentary that indicates racially-motivated dislike of an employee do not 
truly constitute direct evidence of racial motivation for an adverse job action, though courts have 
treated it as if it did. See, e.g., Plaisance v. Travelers Ins. Co., 880 F. Supp. 798, 807 (N.D. Ga. 1994) 
("Direct evidence consists of the actions or remarks of an employer reflecting a discriminatory 
attitude"). However, even if such language is not direct evidence of discrimination, it can be important 
to proving discrimination. See Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 151 F.3d at 1323 n.ll (11th Cir. 
1998) (per curiam) ("Language not amounting to direct evidence, but showing some racial animus, may 
be significant evidence of pretext once a plaintiff has set out the prima facie case"). 
7. However, employers have not always completely shied away from overt discrimination. Of 
course, employers have been more willing to indicate their gender preferences than their race 
preferences. Compare Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (detailing company's 
explicit exclusion of women with preschool age children from certain jobs) with Duke Power Co. v. 
Griggs, 401 U.S 424 (1971) (reviewing company's installation of tests and high school diploma 
requirement that disproportionately disqualified black workers just when Title VII required end of 
explicitly discriminatory practices). 
8. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
9. This test is not limited to proving race discrimination See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (applied in age discrimination context). 
10. The McDonnell Douglas test was a change. See Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court Muddies the Evidentiary Waters In Circumstantial 
Discrimination Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 385 (1994) (noting that before the McDonnell Douglas test, 
employment discrimination cases were treated just like other civil litigation cases). 
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Court needed to make explicit that the indirect method of proof was a legitimate 
way to prove any case, including one of racial discrimination.11 The second is that 
the Court believed that specifying that an indirect method of proof is allowable in 
the Title VII context was necessary to guarantee that courts did not dismiss cases 
or grant summary judgment just because no smoking-gun evidence of 
discrimination existed. This concern could stem from the belief that meritorious 
Title VII claims might not receive a full hearing simply because proving 
discrimination can be difficult.12 Regardless of its justification, the McDonnell 
Douglas test explicitly provides an indirect route to Title VII relief. 
The McDonnell Douglas test first requires the plaintiff to prove a prima facie 
case of discrimination, then requires the employer to provide legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons (LNR) for its actions, and finally requires the plaintiff to 
prove that the employer's reasons are pretext for discrimination. The prima facie 
case varies from case to case, and merely constitutes any set of facts sufficient to 
support an inference of discrimination.13 Proof of the prima facie case yields a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption of discrimination that requires that a verdict 
be directed in the plaintiff's favor if the employer does not rebut it.14 The 
presumption of discrimination is fully rebutted when the employer articulates an 
LNR for its actions. The employer need not prove that the LNR is the reason for 
the job action; it need merely articulate the LNR.15 That the presumption of 
discrimination is fully negated with the mere articulation of a reason for the job 
action suggests that the presumption was meant as a strong incentive for the 
employer to present a case rather than as a reflection of a belief that the prima 
facie case actually proves discrimination.16 
11. That McDonnell Douglas may merely have been a formalization of the process that district 
courts and courts of appeals were engaging in would certainly be consistent with the notion that the 
three-part test flows from common sense rather than judicial demand. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. 
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (suggesting that the McDonnell Douglas test "is merely a sensible, 
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question 
of discrimination"); Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 353 (8th Cir. 1972) affd 411 
U.S. 792 (1973) ("When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifications to fill a job 
opening and that he was denied the job which continues to remain open, we think he presents a prima 
facie case of racial discrimination"). 
12. Given that at the time McDonnell Douglas was decided all Title VII trials were bench trials, the 
McDonnell Douglas structure, including its mandatory presumption of discrimination, would seem to 
have been aimed at reluctant judges. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provided plaintiffs the right to jury 
trials in Title VII cases. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, -1977A(c) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. 1981a(c) (2000). 
13. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973) (noting that facts of a 
prima facie case vary from case to case). Of course, many different sets of facts may support an 
inference of discrimination. See Scarriano v. Municipal Credit Union, 894 F. Supp. 102, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 
1995) (suggesting that a prima facie case is proven when any set of facts creating inference of 
discrimination exists); Perkins v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 934 F. Supp. 857, 862 (W.D. Mich. 1996) 
(suggesting that a prima facie case may require that plaintiff prove he or she "was treated differently 
than similarly situated non-minority employees"). 
14. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981). 
15. See id at 254; St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). 
16. That the presumption is fully negated is clear. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 
510 ("If ... the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas 
framework-with its presumptions and burdens- is no longer relevant"). 
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After the LNR is proffered, the plaintiff is allowed to prove that the LNR is 
pretext either by proving it untrue or by proving that discrimination better 
explains the employer's action.17 Proof that the LNR is untrue leaves the finder of 
fact with no reason on which the employer can rely to explain the particular job 
action. Conversely, proof that intentional discrimination is more likely the reason 
for the employer's actions leaves the employer's proffered reason as a possible 
explanation of the action, but as an unconvincing one. The Court has made clear 
that these two methods of proving pretext are independent and that either method 
is sufficient to sustain a verdict 18 
The debate regarding what impact proof that the LNR is untrue or not 
credible should have has raged for years. Some have argued that proof that the 
proffered reasons were not the real reasons coupled with the prima facie case was 
sufficient to mandate a finding for the plaintiff.19 This is the pretext-only position. 
Others have argued that such proof was evidence, though not dispositive evidence, 
of the intentional discrimination.20 Yet others have argued that such proof alone 
might allow a plaintiff to avoid a directed verdict in the employer's favor. 21 This is 
the pretext-plus position. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, provided the 
Supreme Court's opinion on the issue, though even that decision has not ended 
the debate. 
2. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and The Import of Proof of Pretext 
In Hicks, the Supreme Court ruled simply that proof of pretext - proving that 
LNRs proffered by an employer were untrue or not credible - was not proof that it 
was more likely than not that intentional discrimination had motivated a 
particular employment decision. To understand the ruling fully, a short recitation 
of the facts in Hicks is necessary. Plaintiff Melvin Hicks' formal termination from 
St. Mary's Honor Center occurred when "he was discharged for threatening 
Powell [his supervisor] during an exchange of heated words[.]"22 This exchange 
ended a downward spiral of Hicks' employment during which Hicks "became the 
subject of repeated, and increasingly severe, disciplinary actions."23 Hicks claimed 
that racial discrimination explained the course of action that culminated in his 
termination.24 At trial, after Hicks proved a prima facie case, St. Mary's Honor 
17. That either prong is an appropriate way to demonstrate pretext is clear. See Burdine, 450 U.S. 
at256. 
18. Seeid. 
19. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the 'Pretext· 
PillS' Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 77-91 {1991) (reviewing the use 
of pretext-only and pretext-plus rules in federal courts). 
20. See, e.g., Blanks v. Waste Mgmt. of Ark., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 673, 677 (E.D. Ark. 1998) ("But it 
is not enough that the employee submits evidence of pretext such that the factfinder disbelieves the 
employer's 'legitintate' reasons .... An employee's proof of pretext is relevant to, but not dispositive 
of, the ultintate issue of discrimination") (citation omitted). 
21. See Lanctot, supra note 19. 
22. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505 {1993). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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Center proffered "the severity and the accumulation of rules violations committed 
by" Hicks as the reasons for his termination.25 As a result of Hicks' evidence that 
such explanations were not true, the district court, sitting as factfinder, found that 
the reasons proffered by the employer were not the true reasons for Hicks' 
firing.26 However, the court also found that Hicks had not met his burden of 
proving that intentional discrimination caused his termination, and rendered 
judgment for St. Mary's Honor Center.27 That judgment was reversed by the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.28 
In the Supreme Court, Hicks argued that the finding that the employer's 
reasons were not the true reasons for the termination should have mandated a 
ruling in his favor.29 Under the McDonnell Douglas test, an employer that 
proffers no reason for its job action in the face of a proven prima facie case 
automatically loses?0 Thus, the proffer and rejection of LNRs as untrue or not 
credible would seem to put the employer in at least as bad a position, i.e., a losing 
one, as it would be in if it had not offered any explanation for the job action. The 
Supreme Court disagreed. 
Rather than focus on the procedural aspects of the McDonnell Douglas test, 
the Supreme Court focused on the ultimate question raised by a Title VIT 
disparate treatment discrimination claim: Did the employer intentionally 
discriminate against the employee?31 This focus allowed the Hicks Court to hold 
that proof that the employer's LNRs were untrue or not credible allowed, but did 
not require, a finder of fact to determine that intentional discrimination was more 
likely than not the cause of the job action.32 While treating intentional 
discrimination as a fact question that generally cannot be definitively decided 
merely by proving that the LNR is untrue appeared uncontroversial to the 
majority, the implications of the decision were controversial. 
The Court's treatment of this style of proof of pretext necessarily required a 
reexamination and narrowing of the McDonnell Douglas test. Rather than treat 
the McDonnell Douglas test as a substantive one or even as a procedural one with 
substantive implications, the Court determined that the test was purely 
procedural.33 The Hicks Court limited the import of the McDonnell Douglas test 
to helping make certain that all of the evidence surrounding an indirect intentional 
discrimination case was presented. The mandatory presumption of discrimination 
that accompanies proof of a prima facie case is merely a vehicle to coax an LNR 
from the employer, and meant nothing once the employer articulated the LNR. 
25. These reasons became the LNR sufficient to rebut the presumption of discrimination that 
flowed from Hicks' proof of a prima facie case. I d. at 507. 
26. Id. 
27. I d. at 508. 
28. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., Div. of Adult Inst. of Dept. of Corr. and Human Res. of 
State of Mo., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.1992). 
29. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509. 
30. This is the effect of the presumption of discrimination See id. 
31. ld. at 511. 
32 ld. 
33. ld. at509-ll. 
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Once the employer's burden of production was satisfied, the inquiry and all 
evidence, including the prima facie case and proof of pretext, focused on one 
question: Did intentional discrimination occur? 
Rather than treat the McDonnell Douglas test as illuminating, the Hicks 
Court treated it as obscuring the ultimate question of intentional discrimination 
with intermediate questions that were merely related to, but not dispositive of, the 
actual question to be answered. Thus, according to the Court, the test was 
appropriately ignored once the presumption of discrimination was rebutted. Of 
course, in ignoring the McDonnell Douglas test, the Court also ignored the factual 
implications that flowed from the proof of pretext, never adequately answering 
how a factfinder can determine, in the face of a prima facie case and proof that the 
employer's reasons for firing an employee are false, that it is more likely than not 
that discrimination did not occur.34 In simplifying the issue to be determined in 
Title VII indirect proof cases to a single question, the Supreme Court minimized 
the importance of the structure that had been built around the inquiry in the 
preceding 20 years and failed to appreciate the complex considerations that swirl 
around a seemingly simple question. The Court's simplification is somewhat 
troubling given that the structure it ignored was built in part precisely because 
determining whether discrimination exists is not an easy task. Of course, this was 
only the first area in which the Court attempted to simplify discrimination. 
B. Simplifying Sex Discrimination 
The Supreme Court has simplified sexual harassment and sex discrimination 
in two recent cases. In Sundowner Offshore Services Inc. v. Oncale,35 the Court 
determined that whether a sexually harassing course of conduct is actionable 
depends solely on whether it violates Title VII's prohibition against sex 
discrimination, not on whether it conforms to previous standards of sexual 
harassment. In Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth,36 the Court distinguished quid 
pro quo and hostile work environment harassment solely by reference to the 
damage flowing from the underlying harassment, rather than other previously 
important factors. 
1. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. v. Oncale 
The question the Oncale Court answered is simple: Is same-sex sexual 
harassment cognizable under Title VII?37 Its answer was in doubt because of the 
narrow explanation that courts had given for why sexual harassment constituted 
34. The question is not aimed at claiming that the discrimination undoubtedly occurred, just that it 
more likely than not occurred See Henry L. Chambers, Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in tlte 
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1, 54-59 (1996). 
35. 523 u.s. 75 (1998). 
36. 524 u.s. 742 (1998). 
37. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 76 ("This case presents the question whether workplace harassment can 
violate Title VII's prohibition against 'discrminat[ion] ..• because of ... sex,' ... when the harasser 
and the harassed employee are of the same sex" (citation omitted)). 
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sex discrimination.38 Sexual harassment was thought to be sex-based conduct or 
conduct based on sexual desire that yielded discriminatory terms or conditions of 
employment.39 That sexual harassment focused on sex was no surprise given that 
Supreme Court sexual harassment cases had tended to involve sex-based conduct 
or conduct based on sexual desire and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's guidelines on sexual harassment.40 Sexual harassment amounted to 
sex discrimination because the sex-based conduct ostensibly would not have 
occurred but for the victim's gender. Since sexual harassment's actionability was 
so linked to sex-based activity, there was serious dispute regarding whether same-
sex conduct, particularly when not involving homosexuals or homosexual desire, 
could constitute sexual harassment.41 Oncale ended the dispute. 
In Oncale, the plaintiff alleged that he was sexually harassed and threatened 
with rape by members of the eight-man crew on the offshore rig on which he 
worked, and that he quit as a result of the harassment.42 Two of the alleged 
harassers had supervisory duties.43 The Court's ruling was simple and clear: 
Whenever sexually harassing conduct, including same-sex conduct, constitutes sex 
discrimination, it is actionable under Title VII.44 
While the Court's conclusion might seem obvious, it was at odds with some 
of the courts that had previously opined on the subject.45 Additionally, the ruling 
was somewhat surprising given that the Court could have decided Oncale on 
different and narrower grounds. If the sex-based threats suffered by Oncale were 
taken merely as the harassers' chosen form of gender-neutral harassment rather 
than a prelude to sexual activity, Oncale could have been deemed not to involve 
sexual harassment, but merely a particularly troubling brand of horseplay not to 
be redressed under Title VII.46 Conversely, the Court could have viewed the 
38. Interestingly, a number of commentators have suggested that the Court has never given an 
adequate explanation for why sexual harassment is sex discrimination. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., A 
Unifying Theory of Sex Discrimination, 34 GA. L. REv. 1591, 1604 n.54 (2000) (citing articles 
suggesting that the Supreme Court has not articulated precisely why sexual harassment is sex 
discrimination). 
39. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination because of Sex, 
29 C.F.R. 1604.11 (1999) (defining sexual harassment largely in relation to sex or sex-based activities 
such as se:;:ual advances and requests for sexual favors). 
40. The sexual harassment cases on which the Supreme Court had issued opinions involved sex-
based behavior. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (involving allegations of 
unwanted se:mal advances and rape); Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (involving largely 
immature behavior and language that focused on sex). 
41. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (noting problems that courts have had applying Title VII to same sex 
sexual harassment). 
42. I note that the actions are alleged merely because of the procedural posture in which the case 
reached the court- on appeal of a suntmary judgment ruling against the plaintiff. I d. at 77. 
43. Id. 
44. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80 ("Title VII prohibits 'discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex' in the 
'terms' or 'conditions' of employment. Our holding that this include[ s] sexual harassment must extend 
to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements"). 
45. I d. at 79 (noting the different ways courts had viewed the same sex harassment question). 
46. Some have suggested that Oncale may blur the line between actionable conduct and non-
actionable horseplay. See, e.g., Wendy M. Parr, Casenote, When Does Male-on-Male Horseplay 
Become Discrimination Because of Sex?: Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 25 Omo N.U. 
L. REV. 87 (1999). 
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alleged conduct as quintessentially sex-based and thus treated it as sex-based 
harassment-an already recognized type of sexual harassment - involving 
homosexual threats made by heterosexuals. 
Rather than further define or parse what is sexual harassment, the Oncale 
Court suggested that Title VII was simply written and should be simply applied. 
The Court eliminated much of the structure surrounding sexual harassment, 
including the notion that sexual harassment was necessarily about sexual activity.47 
Simply, the Court noted that harassing activity need merely be undertaken 
because of the employee's sex or gender to constitute potentially actionable sex 
discrimination.48 Though the Oncale Court arguably broadened the conduct that 
can be deemed actionable sexual harassment, it also left the decision regarding 
whether a particular course of sexually harassing conduct would constitute 
actionable sex discrimination to courts and factfinders, by suggesting that context 
would determine whether any particular course of conduct would qualify as 
actionable sexual harassment.49 As with the Court's decision in Hicks, this leaves 
the factfinder with the task of determining when discrimination has occurred 
without much guidance regarding how to undertake the task. 
2. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 
The Court's desire for simplification was also apparent in Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth. 50 There, the Court simplified the structure surrounding 
sexual harassment by redefining how sexual harassment claims should be 
categorized.51 Traditionally, sexual harassment has been divided into quid pro 
quo and hostile work environment harassment.52 Before Ellerth, quid pro quo 
harassment was generally thought to encompass situations where job benefits, or 
the avoidance of job detriment, were conditioned on sexual activity.53 Conversely, 
47. Certainly, some courts and commentators had previously suggested that sexual harassment was 
about more than sexual conduct. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 
YALE LJ. 1683 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. 
REv. 691 (1997); L. Camille Hebert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 565 
(1995). 
48. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 ("But harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to 
support an inference of discrintination on the basis of sex. A trier of fact might reasonably find such 
discrintination, for example, if a female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by 
another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of 
women in the workplace"). 
49. Id. at 81-82 (noting that the same behavior may have different implications for sexual 
harassment depending on the context in which it occurs). 
50. 524 u.s. 742. 
51. The other large issue in El/erth was the standard of liability that employers face for sexual 
harassment claims and the affirmative defense that may accompany it. I have largely ignored this 
aspect of El/erth and another case decided on the same day, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775 (1998), because that issue focuses less on constructing discrintination and more on what to do once 
the fact of discrintination has been proven. 
52. For a discussion of the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment actions 
before and after El/erth, see Chambers, supra note 38, at 1609-33. 
53. See, e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 2000) (validating a pre-E/Ierth jury 
instruction allowing recovery under quid pro quo theory if plaintiff "suffered or was threatened with a 
materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of her employment as the result of her refusal to 
comply with the sexual requests and advances"); Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dept., 174 F.3d 95,120-
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hostile work environment harassment encompassed situations where sexual 
harassment was so severe or pervasive that it materially altered employees' 
working conditions.54 The categorization process is important because employers 
are vicariously liable for some claims, are vicariously liable subject to an 
affirmative defense for some claims, and are only liable for their negligence 
regarding other claims. Thus, Ellerth did not expand the reach of Title VII; it 
altered how to analyze conduct that all would concede is subject to Title VII. 
In Ellerth, the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor's supervisor made 
numerous sex-based advances and comments to and about her during her tenure.55 
While she apparently received pay raises and promotions at Burlington, she quit 
her job after fourteen months alleging that she quit because of the harassing 
conduct.56 Thus, Ellerth focused on what to do in a situation where sexual 
harassment may have occurred, but had not caused tangible detriment to the 
plaintiff's employment. Under the categorization process in place before Ellerth 
was decided, Ellerth's treatment could have been considered to include aspects of 
both quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment.57 Not so after 
Ellerth was decided. 
After noting that the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment was somewhat artificial and not particularly useful, the Ellerth Court 
determined that quid pro quo harassment encompassed sexual harassment that 
caused a tangible job detriment and that hostile work environment harassment 
encompassed sexual harassment that did not cause a tangible job detriment. 58 The 
Ellerth Court simplified the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment claims with a bright line so clear that there should be little confusion 
regarding whether or not a quid pro quo claim has been pleaded. For example, 
claims based on unfulfilled threats, which may have been thought to involve quid 
pro quo conduct, are now clearly considered hostile work environment claims. 59 
While this change may not affect a large number of plaintiffs, it may be of 
concern, particularly if some unfulfilled threats will not be actionable because they 
are not considered sufficiently severe or pervasive, as required for hostile work 
environment harassment to be actionable.60 
21 (3rd Cir. 1999)(validating pre-Ellerth jury instruction that might have allowed recovery under quid 
pro quo theory for the mere conditioning of job benefits on sexual activity rather than the imposition 
of actual job detriment). 
54. See Chambers, supra note 38, at 1616-33 (discussing hostile work environment harassment). 
55. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-48. 
56. Indeed, Ellerth alleged constructive discharge as a result of the harassment. However, 
constructive discharge cases are difficult to prove. See Cross v. Chicago School Reform Board of 
Trustees, 80 F. Supp. 2d 911, 916-17 (N.D. ill. 2000) (noting how difficult it is to prove a constructive 
discharge case). 
57. The Court of Appeals considered Ellerth's claim to have elements of both causes of action. See 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749-50 (noting the Court of Appeals' difficulty in characterizing Ellerth's claim). 
58. I d. at 752. 
59. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1006 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Of course, in 'supervisor 
harassment' cases such as this, the terms 'quid pro quo' and 'hostile environment' remain relevant only 
to the extent they illustrate the evidentiary distinction between cases involving threats which are 
carried out and those featuring offensive conduct in general"). 
60. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)(noting that hostile work 
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Ellerth, Oncale and Hicks simplify discrimination or the processes 
surrounding it. Ellerth's import regarding this issue is merely to confirm that the 
Court continues to desire simplification in Title Vll. Since its impact is limited to 
a narrow area, further discussion of Ellerth will be minimal. Conversely, Hicks 
and Oncale may substantially alter how race and sex discrimination may be viewed 
and proven by allowing factfmders more freedom to determine whether 
discrimination exists. Hicks frees factfinders from required findings of 
discrimination allowing them to determine on their own whether discrimination 
has really occurred; Oncale frees factfinders from strict categorization to allow 
them to determine on their own what conduct should be deemed discrimination. 
Discussion now turns to their implications of this restructuring. 
IT. OPERATIONALIZING SIMPLIFICATION 
The Supreme Court's simplifications allow trial and appellate courts to 
reexamine settled notions of discerning discrimination, paring away concepts that 
do not precisely fit their particular vision of Title VII. This, of course, is of 
concern. 
A. Interpreting Hicks 
The Hicks Court made three central points respecting the McDonnell 
Douglas test. The first is that the prima facie case is relatively weak.61 The second 
is that the mandatory presumption of discrimination is procedural and is rendered 
completely irrelevant once rebutted.62 The third is that proof of the falsity of the 
employer's proffered reasons does not guarantee a verdict for the plaintiff. 63 Each 
point undermined the McDonnell Douglas test and buttressed the notion that 
intentional discrimination is the only issue in a disparate treatment Title VII case, 
and that issue is to be decided by the factfinder. 
1. The Prima Facie Case 
The Hicks Court's analysis of the· prima facie case can be interpreted to 
suggest that the prima facie case is always weak.64 Though the prima facie case is 
not invariably weak, some courts appear to believe it is.65 The prima facie case can 
be constructed in at least two ways - as a checklist of facts that appear relevant to 
discrimination or as a set of facts aimed directly at supporting an inference of 
environment harassment must be severe or pervasive to be actionable). 
61. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 (noting the minimal requirements of the prima facie case). 
62 Id. at 510-11 ("The presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come 
forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture"). 
63. I d. at 519 ("It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve [sic] the employer, the factfinder must 
believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination"). 
64. However, some courts have recognized that some prima facie cases are stronger than others. 
See, e.g., Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 465 (1st Cir. 1996)(suggesting that strong prima facie 
cases exist and necessarily suggesting that weak ones exist as well). 
65. Dyer v. TW Services, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 981, 984 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (noting that the prima facie 
case requires minimal proof); Johnson v. Arkansas State Police, 10 F.3d 547,551 (8th Cir.1993) (noting 
that the evidence supporting the prima facie case is minimal). 
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discrimination.66 Only when the prima facie case is viewed as a checklist of facts 
and is constructed without care is a prima facie case necessarily weak.67 While the 
McDonnell Douglas Court's listing of specific facts that would suffice to prove a 
prima facie case in that factual setting might lead one to view the prima facie case 
as a checklist, the appropriate way to view the prima facie case is as a set of facts 
that creates an inference of discrimination.68 Indeed, that has been a vision 
attributed to the McDonnell Douglas test.69 
Courts viewing the prima facie case as any set of facts that supports an 
inference of discrimination have taken various paths to guarantee that the prima 
facie case does support an inference of discrimination.70 Some courts simply 
explicitly require that the prima facie case support an inference of 
discrimination.71 Of course, such a case cannot be dismissed as inconsequential or 
perfunctory, even if it alone does not necessarily prove that intentional 
discrimination occurred. Other courts require that the prima facie case include 
allegations that the plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated 
employees of a different race.72 Such prima facie cases necessarily support an 
inference of discrimination since differential treatment is the hallmark of a 
disparate treatment claim.73 Indeed, this relatively significant amount of proof, if 
unrebutted, should plainly support a verdict for plaintiff. While the prima facie 
66. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
67. Of course the specific requirements of a prima facie case will be different depending on the 
context of the case. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. 
68. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 254 (suggesting that prima facie case may require facts that would 
support inference of discrimination); Plaisance v. Travelers Ins. Co., 880 F. Supp. 798, 808 (N.D. Ga. 
1994) ("In evaluating whether a plaintiff has satisfied the initial burden of a prima facie case, the 
central inquiry is whether the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to create an inference, i.e., 
a rebuttable presumption, that the employer's personnel decision was based on impermissible 
considerations"). 
69. See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)(suggesting that prima facie case 
creates inference of discrimination); Murphy v. Housing Auth. of At!. City, 32 F. Supp. 2d 753, 763-64 
(D.N.J. 1999) (suggesting that inference of discrimination arises from prima facie case because the facts 
supporting a prima facie case allow the presumption that impermissible factors have guided the subject 
decision). 
70. See Chambers, supra note 34, at 17-18. 
71. If the prima facie case cannot support the inference, it does not qualify as a prima facie case. See 
Scarriano v. Municipal Credit Union, 894 F. Supp. 102, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[P]laintiff must establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing by a preponderance of the evidence the following: 1) 
he belongs to a protected class; 2) his job performance was satisfactory; 3) he was discharged; and 4) 
his discharged occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination"); Blanks v. 
Waste Mgmt. of Ark., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 673, 676 (E.D. Ark. 1998) ("A plaintiff may establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination based upon discharge from employment by showing ... ( 4) his discharge 
occurred under circumstances which allow the court to infer unlawful discrimination"); Khan v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 272,276 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("In this case, to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination, plaintiff is required to establish ... ( 4) that the decision occurred under 
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination"). 
72 See, e.g., Perkins v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 934 F. Supp. 857, 862 (W.D. Mich. 1996) ("This 
[prima facie case] requires that the plaintiff establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he 
was a member of a protected class; (2) he was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) he was 
qualified for the job; and (4) for the same or similar conduct he was treated differently than similarly 
situated non-minority employees"). 
73. See Murphy v. Housing Auth. of At!. City, 32 F. Supp. 2d 753, 763 (D.N.J. 1999) (noting that 
being treated differently that similarly situated employees defines a disparate treatment violation). 
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case alone is rarely, if ever, sufficient to prove intentional discrimination 
conclusively, when it supports an inference of discrimination, it has some factual 
force. 
Though a prima facie case is rarely a proven discrimination case, when 
substantial evidence supports it, it can provide a factual background in which 
discrimination can be inferred even when the employer has a plausible defense. 
Unfortunately, the value of the prima facie case is somewhat unclear after the 
Hicks simplification precisely because the Hicks Court did not explain that a 
prima facie case may retain factual force in the face of the articulation of an LNR. 
By deeming intentional discrimination the only important issue, the Court 
suggests that the prima facie case is something of a necessary distraction. This 
allows trial courts to view the prima facie case in various appropriate and 
inappropriate ways, and provides the opportunity for courts to refashion the 
contents of specific prima facie cases.74 
De-emphasizing or incorrectly defining the proper role of the prima facie 
case can result in inappropriate evidence being required to support a prima facie 
case. The importance the Hicks Court places on the ultimate question of 
intentional discrimination can suggest that evidence supporting a prima facie case 
should mirror evidence that would support a proven intentional discrimination 
case, i.e., that some proof of intentional discrimination is necessary to prove a 
prima facie case. This conflation of the prima facie case with the ultimate burden 
of proof may confuse courts into requiring that pretext or other evidence be 
presented as part of the prima facie case. The suggestion that prima facie cases 
are weak, and that quasi-direct proof of intentional discrimination must be strong 
to support a verdict, can create an impression that culminates in courts requiring 
much stronger evidence than should be required for a plaintiff to avoid summary 
judgment or to win a verdict.75 Similar problems arise from the Hicks Court's 
74. Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999), is an example of this phenomenon. In 
Iadimarco, the court had to determine what set of facts would suffice as a prima facie case in a so-
called reverse discrimination case. Though the court eventually required the same set of facts for a 
reverse discrimination prima facie case as for a standard discrimination prima facie case, it did so for 
the wrong reasons, appearing to suggest that any particular set of facts, whether applied to a situation 
involving a minority plaintiff or a non-minority plaintiff, yields the same inferences. Id. at 160 
(rejecting different prima facie test for reverse discrimination cases than for regular discrimination 
cases). Since, the content of the prima facie case that the Iadimarco Court required was sufficient to 
support an inference of discrimination in any discrimination case, its decision was ultimately sound. I d. 
at 161 (noting that the test for both reverse and regular discrimination cases required that the employer 
"treat[] some people less favorably than others based upon a trait that is protected under Title VII"). 
However, the court's reasoning seems to ignore the recognition implicit in McDonnell Douglas that 
racial discrimination against minorities is a background feature of the American workplace. Since 
there is little reason to believe that racial discrimination against non-minorities is a background feature 
of the American workplace, the facts supporting a regular discrimination case might be insufficient to 
support an inference of discrimination in a reverse discrimination case. Presumably, this is why some 
courts that had analyzed the issue prior to the Iadimarco court had required that reverse discrimination 
plaintiffs prove additional background factors that would make inferring discrimination from the facts 
underlying a regular prima facie case reasonable in a reverse discrimination case. 
75. The district court decision reversed in Johnson v. Arkansas State Police, 10 F.3d 547 {8th Cir. 
1993), may be an example of this. In Johnson, the plaintiff gained a reversal of the trial court's verdict, 
which was based on the court's belief that the plaintiff had not proved a prima facie case. Id. at 550. 
While plaintiff may not have carried his ultimate burden in the case, he had demonstrated that 
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treatment of the presumption of discrimination flowing from a proven prima facie 
case. 
2. The Presumption of Discrimination and LNRs 
The Hicks Court's single-minded focus on the question of intentional 
discrimination has devalued the steps of the McDonnell Douglas test not directly 
aimed at that question. The import of the presumption of discrimination is a 
casualty of this approach. Rather than treating the presumption of discrimination 
as a stronger version of the inference of discrimination created by the prima facie 
case, the Supreme Court treats the presumption as nothing more than a 
procedural mechanism that is not substantively connected with the prima facie 
case and which is completely negated by the articulation of the LNR. 76 One 
danger in treating the presumption in this way is that it may appear to give the 
LNR more credit than it deserves. 
The power to rebut the presumption of discrimination given to the 
articulated, but unproven, LNR may suggest that a court can ignore the factual 
import of the prima facie case and render summary judgment in favor of a 
defendant whenever an LNR has been presented and proof of intentional 
discrimination is lacking.77 Of course, to the extent that a factfinder generally 
remains free to disbelieve an employer's LNR, it is unclear that it would ever be 
similarly situated officers of a different race were treated differently than he. ld. at 553. Given that 
this unquestionably can support an inference of discrimination and thus establishes a prima facie case, 
the appellate court's suggestion that the district court appeared to require that proof necessary to 
prevail be presented as part of the prima facie case appears apt. The requirement that pretext 
evidence be presented as part of the prima facie case likely stemmed from the belief that the ostensibly 
weak prima facie needed more power to support even an inference of discrimination. I d. at 551 ("The 
threshold of proof necessary to make a prima facie case is minimal and the district court improperly 
conflated the prima facie case \vith the ultimate issue in this Title VII case.") (citing Saint Mary's 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)). Slightly altered, this notion may explain what concerned the 
Iadimarco court. See Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 163 (suggesting that requiring that reverse discrimination 
plaintiffs prove background factors that would support an inference of discrimination may force such 
plaintiffs present pretext evidence as a part of their prima facie case). 
76. See Terry v. Electronics Data Sys. Corp., 940 F. Supp. 378 (D. Mass. 1996), demonstrates how 
courts may interpret this aspect of St. Mary's. In Terry, plaintiff charged that the employer's refusal to 
hire him was based on discrimination. Plaintiff proved a prima facie case, demonstrating that he was 
qualified for the job because he had been performing it satisfactorily on a temporary basis before he 
applied for the permanent job. The employer countered that plaintiff was not hired permanently 
because a background check uncovered a delinquent student loan that the plaintiff could not 
adequately explain. Plaintiff's only evidence of pretext was that the person who ultimately refused to 
employ him had been condescending to him on one occasion and used an uncomfortable strained tone 
of voice when telling plaintiff he would not be permanently employed. I d. at 380. Though the plaintiff 
had proven a prima facie case, it was rendered meaningless by the rebuttal of the presumption. As the 
court noted, once the presumption was rebutted, the prima facie case yielded "a possible inference of 
discrimination should the fact finder find the reason advanced by the defendant to be pretextual." Id. 
at 384 (quoting WILLIAM G. YOUNG, ET AL., MASSACHUSETIS EVIDENCE, 19 Mass. Prac. Series 
301.12 (West Pub. Co. 1997)). However, it should be clear that this conclusion is only appropriate 
because of the weakness of evidence supporting this plaintiff's prima facie case. Without proof of 
pretext, the plaintiff was "left with a circumstantial case so weak that no reasonable factfinder could, 
\vithout speculation, conclude that he was the victim of racial discrimination." Id. at 387. 
77. The possibility that the prima facie case may retain factual force suggests that in pretext-only 
jurisdictions, granting summary judgment would almost always be inappropriate. Cf. Lattimore v. 
Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 465 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Since Massachusetts is a 'pretext only' jurisdiction, 
proof of pretext is sufficient to warrant a finding of discrimination under Chapter 151B"). 
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appropriate to grant summary judgment to an employer in the face of a proven 
prima facie case. Nonetheless, in such a situation, precisely how much proof of 
pretext would be necessary to avoid summary judgment in such a situation is 
unclear. 
Conversely, a court's cognizance that the rebuttal of the presumption of 
discrimination may require that a plaintiff present extremely strong evidence to 
prevail may lead that court to treat the employer's LNR too cavalierly. For 
example, in Bates v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,18 the court noted that if a factfinder 
finds no evidence to support the employer's claim that the LNR is the real reason 
for the job action, the court need not deem the LNR sufficient to rebut the 
presumption,.79 In Bates, the plaintiff was fired ostensibly for mishandling a cash 
deposit.80 However, problems with the safe into which the plaintiff placed the cash 
deposit and testimony by another employee that the deposit was handled 
appropriately suggested that the employer could not have really believed its 
proffered reason for firing plaintiff, thus allowing the Bates court to question 
whether the LNR was the real reason for the firing.81 The Bates Court noted that 
the articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason would not rebut the 
prima facie case if the employer did not actually rely on the reason in taking the 
job action82 - a sensible notion supported in part by Supreme Court precedent.83 
Nevertheless, it conflicts somewhat with the general notion of pretext and Hicks. 
The Bates Court's position is understandable given that McDonnell Douglas 
and its progeny seem to suggest that an employer that literally lies about its LNR 
should lose. Since the Hicks Court's analysis of proof of pretext makes a failure to 
rebut the mandatory presumption of discrimination the only way to effectuate a 
certain victory for a plaintiff, the Bates decision may merely reflect the court's 
belief that the plaintiff had an airtight case that the plaintiff deserved to win. 
However, Bates should have been resolved based on the factfinder's evaluation of 
pretext ra~er than on the employer's ostensible failure to rebut the presumption 
of discrimination. 
A fabricated LNR is pretextual because it necessarily obscures the real 
reason plaintiff was fired. For example, one who is ostensibly fired for excessive 
tardiness could prove that the reason was pretext either because she was never 
late or because excessive tardiness alone is not an adequate ground for firing an 
employee. Though plaintiff's supposed tardiness would be pretext, it is clear that 
it would rebut the mandatory presumption stemming from proof of her prima 
facie case. That the employer did not and could not present evidence that the 
78. 81 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (N.D. Fla. 2000). 
79. I d. at 1300·02. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. The fact that a theoretical explanation may exist is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.9 {"An articulation not admitted into evidence will not 
suffice. Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by 
argument of counsel"). 
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proffered reason actually supported the firing appears irrelevant.84 Indeed, in 
Hicks, the possible reason eventually given by the district court for plaintiff's 
termination and credited by the Supreme Court - a possibly non-racial vendetta 
against the plaintiff-employee -was denied by the person who fired the plaintiff.85 
The Bates Court as well as those courts that grant summary judgment in the 
face of proven prima facie cases seem to miss the point of the Hicks Court's 
elimination of the presumption of discrimination after the articulation of an LNR -
to make the issue of discrimination a fact question. 86 However, the confusion with 
respect to LNRs and the presumption of discrimination stems directly from the 
Hicks Court focus on simplicity and its failure to suggest explicitly that an LNR 
that rebuts the mandatory presumption of discrimination need not be treated as 
true, and even if believed will rarely eliminate the possibility that a reasonable 
inference of discrimination may flow from a proven prima facie case.87 
3. Proof of Pretext 
Not surprisingly, the Hicks Court's view of pretext allows courts to take 
varying views of the evidence that is required before a plaintiff may prevail. A 
court focusing on the Hicks Court's determination that pretext alone may support 
a verdict for plaintiff may legitimately direct a verdict for plaintiff in the face of 
unrebutted proof of pretext.88 Conversely, given the Court's determination that 
pretext alone does not require a verdict in plaintiff's favor, problems may arise 
even when courts want to give proof of pretext vitality. For example in Lattimore 
v. Polaroid Corp.,89 the court noted: "When the prima facie case is very strong and 
disbelief of the proffered reason provides cause to believe that the employer was 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose, proof of pretext 'may' be sufficient [to 
support a verdict]."90 This reading is correct, but narrow. It suggests that a 
84. This should be distinguished from a situation where the employer presents a reason that is 
eventually shown to be illegitimate or discriminatory. In that situation, the reason should not suffice to 
rebut the prima facie case. 
85. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508 (citing the district court opinion in Hicks for the proposition that non-
racial, personal vendetta caused the firing). See also id. at 543 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he person 
who allegedly conducted this crusade denied at trial any personal difficulties between himself and 
Hicks"). 
86. Bates, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1303 ("The jury determined that, but for her race, Ms. Bates would not 
have been fired. That was a reasonable determination on this record, well within the jury's province"). 
87. The lack of close analysis of what a fact finder can infer from evidence can yield troubling 
implications. In Buggs v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 824 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ind. 1993), the court noted 
that a mistaken belief that causes plaintiff to be terminated does not prove discriminatory intent- the 
prerequisite to a viable Title VII suit. Id. at 847. However, a mistaken belief posed as a reason for a 
termination can be challenged if the employer has never mistakenly fired a non-minority employee on 
such grounds. Indeed, one may not need additional proof to infer intentional discrimination if the 
mistaken belief is deemed too convenient. If an employer fired a black employee under the mistaken 
belief that he was not competent, some factfinders might be comfortable inferring that the real reason 
for the firing was racial discrimination even without additional proof. Id. 
88. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
89. 99 F.3d 456 (1st Cir. 1996). 
90. I d. at 465. See also Plaisance v. Travelers Ins. Co., 880 F. Supp. 798, 807 (N.D. Ga. 1994) ("If 
the trier of fact rejects defendant's proffered reason as incredible, this rejection, coupled with elements 
of plaintiff's prima facie case, may alone support a finding of pretext")(citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr v. 
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standard prima facie case coupled with proof of pretext may not be sufficient to 
sustain a verdict in some situations. 
This is hardly a surprise given the Hicks Court's clear suggestion that proof 
of pretext is distinct from proof of discrimination.91 With this distinction, the 
Hicks Court invites courts to require proof of discrimination before detennining 
that plaintiffs have made a submissible case.92 Thus, a court focusing on the 
distinction might appear to legitimately require direct evidence of discrimination 
in the pretext stage, with the lack of substantial proof of discrimination yielding a 
verdict for the employer.93 Some courts appear to require independent evidence 
of intentional discrimination before being willing to grant verdicts to plaintiffs.94 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)). 
91. This distinction has not been lost on courts hearing race discrimination cases. See, e.g., Perkins 
v. School Board of Pinellas County, 902 F.Supp. 1503, 1509 (M.D. Fla. 1995)("[T]hat employer's 
proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily establish that 
Plaintiff's proffered reason of race is correct")( citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 
(1993)); Youmans v. Manna Inc, 33 F. Supp. 2d 462,465 (D.S.C.l998)(appearing to distinguish proof 
of pretext from proof that race was the real reason for the job action). 
92. Indeed, in Buggs v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co., 824 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ind. 1993), a 
case decided less than two months before Hicks, a district court made clear that when proof of pretext 
was not directly linked to race, such proof might not be sufficient to avoid summary judgment. In 
response to the employer's LNRs, plaintiff recited a lengthy list of allegations that he had been 
mistreated by the company. If the employee's allegations were believed, he was treated extraordinarily 
poorly while doing his job well. While the allegations may not explicitly rebut each of the LNRs, they 
detail a course of conduct that suggest that an African-American employee was unfairly targeted for 
termination. That alone would seem to plaintiff to survive summary judgment given that the 
McDonnell Douglas test allows a plaintiff to prove that race discrimination was a better explanation 
for the job action than the employer's proffered reasons, even when such reasons have not been 
completely discredited. Nonetheless, the Buggs court made clear that the inability to connect the 
allegations directly to race ended the litigation. See id. at 846-47 (noting that the incidents were not 
connected to race and "[did] not attack the articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory motive as a 
pretext or show that it is unworthy of credence"). Simply, the court refused to entertain the notion 
that treating an African-American employee in a way that it appears that no one else at the company 
was treated might support an inference of discrimination. !d. 
93. See, e.g., Youmans v. Manna Inc, 33 F. Supp. 2d 462,465 (D.S.C.1998)("Not only has Plaintiff 
failed to show that Defendant"s reason for 'terminating' him was pretextual but he also has produced 
no evidence to support his claim that his race was the real reason for his 'termination.' Thus, there can 
be no inference of intentional discrimination based on Plaintiff's race"). Unfortunately, it is unclear 
exactly what the court meant. If the suggestion is that quasi-direct evidence that race is the real reason 
for the job action is necessary to sustain an inference of discrimination, this case is deeply flawed. That 
a plaintiff proves that the reasons given are untrue, when added to the prima facie case, would seem to 
be indirect proof that race was the real reason for the job action to sustain an inference of 
discrimination. Conversely, it the court merely meant that either proof that the proffered reasons are 
untrue or proof that it is more likely than not that discrimination caused the action is needed, then the 
case reasonably flows from Hicks. 
94. See, e.g., Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 467 (1st Cir. 1996)("Title VII requires proof 
of something more than pretext. It also requires proof of discriminatory intent"). The requirement of 
a direct link between a plaintiff's claims and race appears clear in Dyer v. TW Services, Inc., 973 F. 
Supp. 981, 984 (W.D. Wash. 1997). There, in response to allegations that he did not perform 
adequately, the plaintiff claimed that the employer treated him unfairly. The plaintiffs allegations 
ranged from complaints about possibly unfair treatment to being forced to be trained by an individual 
"who management knew 'had problems working with persons of color."' Id. The court allowed that 
plaintiff's allegations suggested possible poor treatment, but appeared unrelated to race, as plaintiff 
"offered no specific instances where similarly situated employees of other races were treated 
differently for engaging in conduct similar to Mr. Dyer's." Id. The court declined to link the poor 
treatment to race, without specific proof to that effect. !d. ("Mr. Dyer also fails to offer any evidence 
that would suggest a causal connection between the events that transpired at Denny's and his status as 
an African American"). 
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While this might appear to be supported by the Hicks Court's logic, the opinion 
does not support this renaissance of the pretext-plus vision.95 Of course, requiring 
direct evidence of discrimination would be strange given that a plaintiff with direct 
evidence of discrimination need not use the McDonnell Douglas structure.96 
Unfortunately, the result of the Hicks Court's streamlining of the McDonnell 
Douglas test is confusion regarding what proof of pretext implies. Indeed, the 
Court's dismissal of the importance of proof of pretext has necessitated the 
Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 91 where 
defendants argued that proof of pretext alone would not allow the factfinder to 
make the leap that it was more likely than not that discrimination occurred While 
the Reeves Court, like the Hicks Court, made clear that proof of pretext would 
generally be sufficient to sustain a verdict, it did not rule out the possibility that a 
directed verdict in the face of proof of pretext might be appropriate in some 
cases.93 This still leaves the value of proof of pretext in a confused state. 
The Hicks Court also leaves the McDonnell Douglas structure in a 
somewhat confused state. By undervaluing the McDonnell Douglas structure and 
its implications, the Hicks Court suggests that courts view evidence of pretext 
more skeptically than they should. Proving that an employer's LNRs are untrue is 
not easy. Given that LNRs are provided by the employer presumably to fit the 
contours of its case and are vigorously defended by its counsel, convincing a 
factfinder that the LNRs are untrue or not credible is difficult and should be 
treated as powerful evidence of discrimination when it occurs. A plaintiff's 
showing of pretext should always be sufficient to avoid a directed verdict against a 
plaintiff and should generally yield a verdict for the plaintiff. 
B. Interpreting Oncale 
Ultimately, the Oncale decision may muddle sex discrimination jurisprudence as 
much as it clarified same sex harassment.99 By noting that any harassment, 
including same sex harassment, that amounts to sex discrimination \viii be 
95. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). 
96. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 {198S){stating that the McDonnell 
Douglas test is inapplicable in direct evidence cases). Even in situations where a plaintiff's evidence 
looks similar to direct evidence of discrimination, it may be used to support pretext and the indirect 
method of proof rather than be considered as proof of discrimination. See, e.g., Copley v. Bax Global, 
Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2000)("Although Montgomery's statements to the effect that 
he did not believe 'a blue-eyed blond-haired fellow' could effectively perform Plaintiff's job and that 
Defendant needed a 'Latin' in the position 'to achieve any level of success' are not direct evidence of 
discrimination, they are significant evidence of pretext. When these statements are considered in 
conjunction with the otherwise benign facts that {1) Plaintiff was terminated soon after Montgomery 
became president and (2) Plaintiff was immediately replaced with an individual of Hispanic descent, 
the evidence of pretext is strengthened"). Fortunately, the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
was denied. See 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1351. 
97. 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000). 
98. ld. at 2109. 
99. See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The Supreme Court has 
now cleared away much of the doctrinal underbrush that previously vexed courts confronting same-sex 
harassment claims. There is no longer any doubt that Title VII reaches claims of same-sex 
harassment"). 
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actionable under Title VII, Oncale essentially restates Title VII. 100 In determining 
that same-sex harassment is context-driven, the Oncale Court implicitly suggests 
that all sex discrimination may be context-driven. This invites trial and appellate 
courts to conceive any particular course of conduct as sex discrimination or not at 
their discretion. 101 Thus, Oncale either expands or limits Title VII's reach 
depending on how individual courts interpret what qualifies as sex discrimination. 
Whether a court takes an expansive or a restrictive view of what constitutes sex 
discrimination, Oncale will ostensibly support that court's position. 
An expansive view of sex discrimination encompasses the notion that the 
Oncale Court's recognition of same-sex harassment as sex discrimination 
necessarily broadens the scope of sex discrimination to include all conduct 
recognized as sex discrimination before Oncale and gender-related harassment 
claims that have been denied as non-cognizable in the past.102 For example, 
nonsexual conduct flowing from gender hostility that may not have qualified as 
harassment before Oncale will qualify as sexual harassment after Oncale.103 Some 
courts have acted on this suggestion, arguably expanding the sexual harassment 
cause of action.104 A restrictive view of sex discrimination encompasses the notion 
that Oncale may limit sex discrimination claims.105 An immediate concern is that 
proof of sexual harassment claims may be limited to the style of proof suggested in 
Oncale.106 A long-term concern is that all sex discrimination claims, including 
those that have been traditionally accepted as sex discrimination claims, could be 
reevaluated based on limiting concepts underlying Oncale.107 Both expansive and 
restrictive visions of sex discrimination have emerged as courts have begun to 
apply the Court's simplified vision of sexual harassment to same sex and sexual 
orientation harassment claims. 
Suggesting a somewhat expansive vision of sex discrimination and 
100. Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 {1998). 
101. Id. 
102 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Henderson, No. Civ. AMD98-3312, 2000 WL 462611 at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 5, 
2000) ("Unquestionably, the rights and remedies provided by Title VII encompass protection from a 
hostile work environment based on gender"). Some courts have made clear that Title VII is about 
gender discrimination and nothing more. See, e.g., Raum v. Laidlaw Ltd., 173 F.3d 845, {2nd Cir. 1999) 
("In sum, while Johnston's alleged remarks may have been crass and offensive, they were not 
predicated on Raum's gender and therefore not actionable under Title VII"). 
103. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81. 
104. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Yellow Tech. Services, Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1098-99 {lOth Cir. 1999) (noting 
that derogatory comments regarding women can suggest gender or sexual animus that can properly 
support a hostile work environment claim). 
105. This might also restrict the emergence of new harassment causes of actioJL In Holman v. 
Indiana, 211 F.3d 399 {7th Cir. 2000), the court held that sexually harassing conduct aimed at both male 
and female employees would not support a sexual harassment claim. Even though the conduct might 
have been sufficient to support such a claim had it occurred to either employee alone, the equal 
opportunity harasser's conduct made clear that the style of conduct was not based on gender. The 
court engages in a discussion of Oncale's requirement of discrimination because of sex to suggest that 
differential treatment, not merely sex-based treatment, is necessary for a Title VII claim. See 211 F.3d 
at402-04. 
106. See supra Part I.B.l. 
107. Given how the Hicks decision necessarily allows the reexamination of traditional discrimination 
principles, this concern is not far-fetched. 
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application of Oncale, the court in Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc.,108 a same-sex 
harassment case, focused on the ultimate question of sex discrimination rather 
than on intermediate questions relating to the sexual orientation of the harassers. 
In Fry, the male plaintiff alleged that he was harassed by several male co-workers, 
including being physically touched and verbally assaulted.109 The employer argued 
that plaintiff's failure to suggest or prove that those who harassed him were 
homosexual was fatal to his case.110 The court disagreed, noting that a plaintiff 
need only present sufficient evidence for a fact finder to infer that the plaintiff was 
treated differently because of gender to avoid summary judgment.111 Thus, even 
when harassment is sex-based and a claim would seem to require the invocation of 
homosexual tendencies to prove gender discrimination or differential treatment 
on the basis of gender, proof of the harassers' homosexuality is not required.112 Of 
course, this result is justified under Oncale, where similar conduct occurred and no 
such requirement existed.113 
The Fry court simply asked whether an inference of gender or sex 
discrimination could flow from the conduct the plaintiff endured, implicitly 
ignoring the sexual aspects of the case. This approach validates the notion that 
while sex-based harassment will not always be actionable,114 it will be whenever it 
amounts to sex discrimination.115 This approach is faithful to Oncale because it 
labels the conduct as sex discrimination or not, rather than as same sex harassment 
or not. However, this approach can be problematic in other cases. For example, if 
a course of conduct can be explicitly labeled sexual orientation discrimination, 
other issues arise. 
While sex discrimination is actionable, sexual orientation discrimination has 
not been.116 However, if a particular course of sexual orientation discrimination 
constitutes sex discrimination, it will presumably be actionable. Thus, plaintiffs 
pressing claims that seem to sound in sexual orientation discrimination must argue 
that differential treatment based on homosexuality or perceived homosexuality 
108. 72 F. Supp. 2d 1074 (W.D. Mo. 1999). 
109. Id at 1076-77 (detailing harassing incidents). 
llO. !d. at 1078-79. 
lll. I d. at 1079. See also Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Oncale 
also demonstrates that there is no singular means of establishing the discriminatory aspect of sexual 
harassment So long as the plaintiff demonstrates in some manner that he would not have been treated 
in the same way had he been a woman, he has proven sex discrimination"). Of course, even this 
language allows courts to limit evidence to a relatively narrow evidentiary path if the court sees fit. 
112 Fry, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1078-79 ("Holmes misconstrues the level of factual support required for 
plaintiff to defeat summary judgment. Fry does not have to prove that his harassers are homosexual or 
investigate their sexual history to establish he was discriminated against because he is a man"). 
113. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 76-77. 
114. See, e.g., Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706,714 (B.D. Tex. 2000) ("There is no arguable 
legal basis for contending that perceived sexual preference merits protection merely because it 
concerns sex. The clear meaning of 'sex' under Title VII is not 'intercourse,' but 'gender,' and Mims 
does not allege that he was discriminated against because of his gender"). 
ll5. See, e.g., Bacon v. Art Inst. of Chi., 6 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that allegations of 
same sex sex-based conduct, including rubbing against a co-worker and touching him, was sufficient 
evidence that the plaintiff was "harassed 'because or his gender" to survive summary judgment). 
116. See, e.g., Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., Inc., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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qualifies as sex discrimination in their case.117 Oncale's simplification allows 
plaintiffs to ignore whether their claim is a best deemed a sexual orientation 
discrimination claim and allows those plaintiffs to assert that sex discrimination 
has occurred. Some courts have been favorably disposed to the argument that 
harassment on the basis of perceived homosexuality or actual homosexuality 
yields gender or sex discrimination; others have not.118 Interestingly, the argument 
that sexual orientation discrimination may always be sex discrimination may be 
convincing if sexual orientation harassment generally is about gender roles and 
gender norms, 119 given that discrimination on the basis of gender norms and 
gender roles unquestionably constitutes sex discrimination.120 
Simonton v. Runyon, 121 analyzes this sexual orientation discrimination 
conundrum. After noting that pure sexual orientation discrimination - even of the 
most despicable sort - is not cognizable under Title VII/22 the court discusses the 
interaction of sexual orientation discrimination and same sex harassment.123 
Though it indicated that any course of conduct - whether it can be deemed a 
sexual orientation discrimination claim or not - can support a Title VII claim if it 
supports an inference of sex discrimination, the Court evaluated the alleged 
course of conduct with reference to a narrow vision of what constitutes proof of 
sex discrimination.124 It asked whether the plaintiff could show specifically that 
women in plaintiff's workplace were treated differently than the plaintiff, rather 
than allowing the factfinder to infer that women were treated differently or would 
have been treated differently had they been subject to harassment.125 While this 
method is one way to prove discrimination, it has not been deemed the only way 
117. Id. (recognizing that sexual harassment claint styled as a sexual orientation harassment claim is 
not cognizable under Title VII). 
118. See, e.g., Schmedding, 187 F.3d at 865 {holding that the claint that co-workers treated him as if 
he were homosexual to diminish his masculinity was sufficient to state a claint for sex discrimination); 
Fry v. Holmes Freight Lines, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1074 {W.D. Mo. 1999); see also Ray v. Antioch 
Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (involving Title IX claint by student harassed 
because of perceived homosexuality). 
119. See also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting 
plaintiff's argument that harassment because of homosexuality was sex-plus discrimination when only 
homosexual men were targeted for abuse). 
120. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). See also Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259 
{discussing sex stereotypes and their relationship to homosexual harassment). 
121. 232 F.3d 33, 37 {2d Cir. 2000). 
122. !d. at 36 {"Sintonton has alleged that he was discriminated against not because he was a man, 
but because of his seA"Ual orientation. Such a claint remains non-cognizable under Title VII"). Other 
courts have echoed this. In Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999), the 
plaintiff suffered in a work environment permeated with hostility toward homosexuality. Though the 
workplace was quite literally hostile to the homosexual plaintiff, the court determined that 
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality was not covered by Title VII and rested its grant of 
suntmary judgment against plaintiff on the notion that a Title VII violation is about members of one 
gender being treated differently than members of the other gender. Id at 258-59 . 
123. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 36. 
124. ld. 
125. Id. at 37 ("But since Sintonton does not offer 'direct comparative evidence about how the 
alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in [his] mixed-sex workplace,' and does not allege a 
basis for inferring gender-based anintus, we are unable to infer that the alleged conduct would not have 
been directed at a woman"). 
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to prove discrimination.126 Though plaintiff lost, the court reiterated that 
whenever conduct amounting to sexual orientation discrimination also amounts to 
sex discrimination, it will be cognizable.127 By implicitly endorsing an open 
approach to proving sex discrimination but limiting proof to a narrow evidentiary 
channel, the Simonton court demonstrated the expansive and restrictive ways that 
a court can use Oncale. 
Other courts have also limited how a plaintiff may prove a sexual harassment 
case involving suggestions or allegations of homosexuality. For example, in Mims 
v. Carrier Corp./28 plaintiff alleged he was harassed by a supervisor and co-worker 
who suggested that he was engaged in homosexual conduct with another 
employee.129 The plaintiff lost after the court determined that plaintiff had not 
presented evidence addressing the specific ways the Oncale Court mentioned that 
a plaintiff could prove sex discrimination - that the harasser was motivated by 
sexual desire, that the harasser was motivated by gender hostility or that members 
of other genders were treated differently than plaintiff.130 While proving sex 
discrimination outside of these parameters might be difficult, specifically "limiting 
proof of discrimination to these methods is inappropriately restrictive.131 One 
danger of this approach is that the style of evidence admitted may be limited to 
that which is directly relevant to one of these methods of proof. This would 
necessarily restrict how a plaintiff could create the inference of discrimination and 
prove its case. 
To be clear, the suggestion is not that Oncale will necessarily yield 
particularly problematic cases; indeed, it may not. The cases above allow for 
varied ways to assert and prove sex discrimination. However, that fact suggests 
that the Supreme Court rulings allow an ad hoc, no-rules approach that affords 
different courts the ability to make very different decisions regarding the existence 
and analysis of sex discrimination cases.132 
126. In sex-plus cases, there does not seem to be a strict requirement that plaintiff prove that 
members of the opposite gender were specifically treated poorly. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins the 
court merely asked if Hopkins had been se,.:ually stereotyped, not whether she alone had been sex 
stereotyped. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
127. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 37(noting the possibility of a Title VII claim when sexual orientation 
discrimination is based on sell.'11al stereotypes); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 
2000) ("Thus, under Price Waterhouse, 'sex' under Title VII encompasses both sex - that is, the 
biological differences between men and women - and gender." Discrimination because one fails to act 
in the way expected of a man or woman is forbidden under Title VII); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic 
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) ("In other words, just as a woman can ground an action 
on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of 
femininity, ... a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because 
he did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity"). 
128. 88 F. Supp. 2d 706 (B.D. Tex. 2000). 
129. Id. at 710. 
130. !d. at 714-15. 
131. See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999) (commenting on 
plaintiff's failure to conform his proof to the ways suggested in Oncale: "Yet we discern nothing in the 
Supreme Court's decision indicating that the examples it provided were meant to be exhaustive rather 
than instructive. The Court's focus was on what the plaintiff must ultimately prove rather than on the 
methods of doing so"). 
132.This can be seen when the implications of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
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Ellerth are played out. The biggest implication of the Court's simplification in 
Ellerth is rather clear - unfulfilled threats may only support hostile work 
environment harassment, see Smith v. County of Culpeper, 191 F.3d 448, 1999 WL 
100017, *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 9, 1999)("Even assuming that Smith properly raised her 
quid pro quo claim before the district court, Appellees were entitled to summary 
judgment because she failed to adduce any facts showing that Coleman fulfilled 
the alleged threat to reduce her salary"), though some courts still seem to view 
threats as implicating quid pro quo harassment. See DeClue v. Central Illinois 
Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2000)("Sexual harassment is the form of sex 
discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment that consists of efforts 
either by coworkers or supervisors to make the workplace intolerable or at least 
severely and discriminatorily uncongenial to woman ('hostile work environment' 
harassment), and also ~fforts (normally by supervisors) to extract sexual favors by 
threats or promises ('quid pro quo' harassment)"). However, courts may interpret 
the rule regarding unfulfilled threats in different ways. If credible, but unfulfilled, 
threats are viewed as strong proof of hostile work environment discrimination, 
their treatment may not affect a plaintiff's ability to recover for sexual harassment. 
Conversely, some courts may determine that because unfulfilled threats may only 
support a hostile work environment action, the importance of unfulfilled threats 
has diminished. This would allow those courts to treat individual threats with as 
little meaning as individual acts of hostile work environment harassment, thereby 
diminishing their impact. See Ponticelli v. Zurich American Ins. Group, 16 F. 
Supp. 2d 414, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)("According to Ponticelli, she was nonetheless 
subjected to threats- for example, the threatened poor performance review. Yet 
no review was given. Ponticelli contends that while the threats were never acted 
upon, she continued to endure them and lived with the anticipation of their being 
realized. Assuming arguendo that Callas did make sexual advances toward 
Ponticelli, a threat of a tangible job detriment is insufficient to constitute quid pro 
quo sexual harassment"). The Ponticelli court's skepticism of plaintiff's claims 
allowed it to rely on the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment harassment to disregard the value of the alleged threats. Of course, 
even if courts treat threats as seriously as they should, the threats must be severe 
or pervasive to support Title VII liability. See Anderson v. Dillard's' Inc., 109 F. 
Supp. 2d 1116, 1122 (E.D. Mo. 2000)("Since Plaintiff's claim involves only 
unfulfilled threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work environment claim 
which requires a showing of severe or pervasive conduct"). That could seriously 
impact how successful future sexual harassment plaintiffs will be. For example, 
one court has lumped unfulfilled threats generally with other hostile work 
environment conduct. See Ellis v. Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 191 F.3d 
447, 1999 WL 704692 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1999)("Distinguished from quid pro quo 
harassment, hostile work environment sexual harassment focuses on general 
improprieties such as 'unfulfilled threats"'). This treatment of unfulfilled threats 
cheapens their significance. Given that a credible threat from a supervisor may 
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III. POSSIDLE IMPLICATIONS OF SIMPLIFICATION 
That simplification can be useful hardly matters if it does not fix the problem 
it is supposed to resolve. Title VII is supposed to remedy intentional 
discrimination. The Supreme Court's decisions in Hicks and Oncale tell courts to 
find and remedy discrimination by reading Title VII simply. However, such 
direction does not help remedy discrimination if that process obscures a fact 
finder's ability to discern discrimination. 
In simplifying the discrimination inquiry in Hicks, the Supreme Court 
eliminated the implications of the McDonnell Douglas test while leaving that 
structure intact; in Oncale, the Court eliminated the structure. The broader 
implication of simplification is to allow courts and factfinders freedom in resolving 
the fact question of discrimination on which Title VII cases turn. As sensible as 
this may seem, the history of Title VII litigation suggests that giving factfinders a 
free hand in determining what discrimination is may not be the best approach to 
remedying discrimination.133 
Courts' and factfinders' freer hands to define discrimination may have 
different implications for race discrimination than for sex discrimination. The 
reexamination of race and sex discrimination that may occur will likely be 
structured around or limited by existing Supreme Court analysis. Because the 
Supreme Court's vision of race discrimination is less nuanced than its vision of sex 
discrimination, the process of simplification may have a different impact on race 
discrimination than on sex discrimination. 134 Simply, the Supreme Court appears 
to be somewhat blind to race-plus discrimination while being fully cognizant of 
sex-plus discrimination. The Court's blindness likely stems from the differing 
styles of cases that it has resolved in the race and sex discrimination areas. The 
focus of Supreme Court race discrimination cases has often been pure race 
discrimination, while the focus of sex discrimination cases has often been sex-plus 
discrimination. Thus, the Supreme Court and other courts are simply more 
cognizant of and familiar with sex-plus discrimination arguments than race-plus 
influence an employee greatly, equating such a threat·with a random, hostile 
comment by a co-worker appears quite inappropriate. See Homesley v. 
Freightliner Corp., 2000 WL 1809975 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 8, 2000)(noting distinction 
between threats by supervisor and threats by co-workers). As with Oncale, the 
problem is not necessarily \vith the substance of what courts will do with the 
Supreme Court's rule, it is that courts may have a free hand in interpreting the 
significance of harassing threats is the concern. 
133. Employment discrimination jurisprudence is replete with instances in which courts and 
legislatures have structured the discrimination inquiry to ensure reasonable results. See, e.g., 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228. 
Simply, discrimination is not always easy to determine. 
134. While analyzing age and disability discrimination as well would be preferred, this essay does not 
examine these issues in even cursory fashion. While some race and sex discrimination considerations 
are similar to those in the age and disability area, see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 
S. Ct. 2097 {2000) (using the McDonnell Douglas test in an age discrimination case), the Court has not 
fully explored the similarities or differences. I d. 
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discrimination arguments. 
Since sex-plus discrimination has always been recognized as sex 
discrimination, it has been the baseline of sex discrimination and has been 
relatively easy to discern.135 That sex-plus discrimination has always been 
recognized as sex discrimination stems in part from the willingness of some 
employers to make sex-plus discrimination workplace policy. In these situations, 
the Court had no choice but to determine that policies that discriminated on the 
basis of sex plus some other factor necessarily constituted sex discrimination. For 
example, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta/36 the defendant claimed that Title VII 
allowed it to prohibit women with preschool aged children, though not men with 
preschool aged children, from certain jobs. The Court noted that the practice 
undoubtedly constituted sex discrimination, and would yield liability unless the 
prohibition was justified as a bona fide occupational qualification.137 Similarly, the 
nuanced discussion of sex stereotyping in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins bespeaks 
the Court's familiarity with sex-plus discrimination discourse.138 
While the Court's analysis of sex-plus discrimination may not always be 
consistent, that the Court has long been attuned to the existence of sex-plus 
discrimination suggests that a court will recognize such discrimination when 
confronted with it. Indeed, so many cases note that sex-plus discrimination is sex 
discrimination that backsliding on that issue in the wake of Oncale would 
thankfully be difficult. For those skeptical that courts will follow some established 
rules when given a free hand to redefine discrimination, the extent to which prior 
cases influence courts writing on a somewhat blank slate can be seen by watching 
courts engage in nuanced discussions about sex-plus discrimination with respect to 
same sex harassment and sexual orientation discrimination.139 
Conversely, in resolving race discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has 
often focused on whether the plaintiff has proved pure race discrimination, rather 
than race-plus discrimination. Indeed, the McDonnell Douglas test was arguably 
necessary to reveal pure race discrimination to those who did not want to or could 
not see it. Thus, the baseline of the Court's race discrimination decisions has been 
pure race, rather than race-plus, discrimination. Since the conduct described in 
those decisions was rarely styled as race-plus discrimination, the jurisprudence of 
race-plus discrimination necessarily has not been fully developed by the Court. 
Not surprisingly, the Court's apparent conception of what constitutes race 
discrimination is narrow. 
135. The Court may not always credit sex-plus discrimination, see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 
U.S. 125 (1976) (finding that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination), it knows what it is. 
In the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Congress altered Title VII to treat pregnancy 
discrimination as sex discrimination. 
136. 400 u.s. 542 (1971). 
137. Unfortunately, the Court seemed to entertain the possibility that such conduct might be 
justified. Id. at 544. Justice Marshall noted that antiquated views regarding women with young 
children should not support a bona fide occupational qualification. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
138. See generally, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
139. See supra notes 116-127, and accompanying text. 
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For example, the majority's discussion of race discrimination in Hicks is 
simplistic. The Court does not seem to recognize that the explanation that the 
trial court may have credited in Hicks - that Hicks' supervisor had a personal 
vendetta against Hicks140 - may have had racial motivation that would make the 
explanation discriminatory.141 Indeed, even a marginally nuanced vision of race 
discrimination may not fit into the Court's recent jurisprudence. For example, the 
Hicks Court did not seem to recognize the possibility of discrimination by blacks 
against blacks or even the possibility of discrimination against a particular type of 
minority worker by an employer with a diverse workforce.142 This blind spot for 
race-plus discrimination sets the stage for blindness to race-plus discrimination by 
trial and appellate courts that may be allowed to reinterpret Title VII. 
For example, when an ambitious minority applicant is rejected in favor of a 
subservient minority applicant, some courts may argue that no discrimination can 
be proven.143 While a court might reasonably require a particular type of evidence 
to convince a factfinder that discrimination has occurred, the possibility of race-
plus discrimination makes it clear that discrimination is not automatically 
disproven merely because someone of the plaintiff's race is hired.144 However, a 
lack of substantial precedent encompassing this conclusion may suggest that the 
immediate refusal to explore the discrimination claim might be appropriate. 
Conversely, the inappropriateness of this position is obvious in the sex 
discrimination area. For example, that the mother of a pre-school aged child is 
passed over in favor of a woman without children hardly suggests that sex 
140. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508. 
141. This is particularly disturbing given that discrimination should be deemed to have occurred as 
long as race is a motivating factor in an employment decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) 
("[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that 
race, . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice"). Fortunately, some courts understand the notion that a neutral-sounding 
explanation may hide race discrimination. The court in ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 
1999), demonstrated an understanding of the complexities of discrimination in discussing why the 
argument that the person hired was the right person for the job" may not suffice to destroy the 
inference of discrimination that may flow from a prima facie case. Id. at 166-67(also noting that the 
"right person for the job" reason obviously works to the disadvantage of blacks when a decision maker 
believes that the right person for the job is a white male). 
142. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 513-14 (suggesting skepticism that a minority hiring officer would ever 
disfavor a minority applicant because of the applicant's race). While the Court mentioned its 
incredulity in the course of analyzing the appropriateness of the mandatory presumption of 
discrimination, the tone of the analysis suggests a deeper skepticism of the mere possibility. As for the 
notion that an employer \vith a diverse workforce cannot discriminate, see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 
U.S. 440 (1982) (rejecting diversity of workplace as bottom-line defense to disparate impact 
discrimination). 
143. See, e.g., Meachum v. Temple Univ., 42 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("An employer 
who has declined to hire an applicant for employment but has subsequently hired a member of the 
applicant's protected class defeats the applicant's claim because the employer is deemed to have 
demonstrated that the applicant was rejected for reasons unrelated to the applicants membership in the 
protected class"). 
144. See Buggs v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 824 F. Supp. 842, 846 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (noting that an 
African-American employee's replacement by another African-American employee does not prevent 
the establishment of a prima facie race discrimination case); see also O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin 
Caterers Corp. 517 U.S. 308,312 (1996) (noting that proof that employee's replacement was outside of 
protected class not a prerequisite to establishing prima facie age discrimination claim). 
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discrimination undoubtedly has not occurred. Rather, the discrimination may be 
sex-plus and may be based on a preference for women without preschool aged 
children.145 While such sex-plus discrimination must then actually be proven, the 
plausibility of such an argument is clear because courts have faced similar issues so 
frequently. 
The Court's quest for simplification is not necessarily good or bad. 
However, it does suggest that the Court that determining if it is more likely than 
not that discrimination has occurred can be relatively simple. This view risks 
ignoring the history of discerning discrimination that has come from more than 35 
years of Title VII jurisprudence. While jettisoning that history in favor of allowing 
courts and factfinders a freer hand to discern discrimination will not necessarily 
lead to bad results, it has a great potential to do so, particularly in the race 
discrimination area. Conversely, we may be entering a new era in which courts 
are willing to expand notions of sex and race discrimination to cover a larger array 
of discriminatory behavior that occurs because of sex or race. Whether optimism 
or pessimism is the more appropriate outlook remains to be seen. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's attempts at simplification have the virtue of making 
Title VII ostensibly easier to understand. However, that virtue may become a vice 
if courts do not take the spirit of race and sex discrimination laws to heart. A 
complete simplification of Title VII could take us back to the late 1960s when 
Title VII was young and relatively uninterpreted. While such a vision might be 
appealing to those who believe that Title VII has been misinterpreted for 30-plus 
years, it hardly pleases those who believe that statutory interpretation reveals, 
rather than obscures, their meaning. 
145. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (1971). Of course, a similar situation may arise 
with respect to race when the wrong kind of minority is not hired by an employer who does hire 
minorities generally. 
